Blog

Coding agents are part of your supply chain now: a checklist

14 November 2026 | 5 min

The new risk is less the code an agent writes than what it is allowed to read, install and publish.

Most of the worry about AI coding tools has been about the code they write. The incidents of 2026 point somewhere else: at what the tools are allowed to read, which packages they install, and which credentials sit within reach of a workflow that runs them. Four cases, each with a lesson that applies whatever tool you use.

1. An issue title that became a release

In February a security researcher published a chain against an open-source coding agent's own repository. Its issue triage workflow ran an AI agent on every new issue, from anyone, with shell access. A crafted issue title instructed that agent. From there, poisoning the shared GitHub Actions cache reached the nightly publish workflow and its tokens. On 17 February an unauthorised version of the project's CLI was published to npm with a postinstall script that installed another program. It was deprecated about eight hours later. The maintainers' own correction explains why it happened after the disclosure had already been handled: the wrong token had been revoked, and the exposed one was still live.

Credit to the maintainers for publishing that correction. It is the most useful sentence in the whole write-up.

2. A package name nobody published, until somebody did

AI assistants sometimes suggest package names that sound right and do not exist. Attackers register them; it is called slopsquatting. Aikido described a malicious npm package called unused-imports, a plausible short form of the real eslint-plugin-unused-imports. npm put it on a security hold, and in early February it was still being downloaded about 233 times a week.

3. A hijacked account and a lookalike dependency

In June, according to OX Security, a hijacked npm account was used to swap a dependency in packages belonging to the Mastra AI framework: dayjs was replaced with a lookalike called easy-day-js. Its first version was clean; a later one added a post-install script that stole cryptocurrency. OX counted 141 affected packages.

4. Trusted publishing, trusted to a name

Trusted publishing lets a GitHub workflow publish to npm without a long-lived token, which is a real improvement. Bloom Security found the trust was tied to the repository's name rather than its permanent ID. If a repository was renamed, transferred or deleted, whoever claimed the name could publish. They found more than 1,500 packages exposed. GitHub changed it on 2 October: a trusted publishing configuration that has not been used now expires after 48 hours.

What ties them together

None of these needed a model to write bad code. Each one used the tooling around development: a workflow that gave an agent too much, a name a tool made up, an install script, a trust rule bound to the wrong thing. The checklist below is the same for every agent and every editor.

Where AstraCode fits

AstraCode treats what a repository carries as untrusted until you say otherwise. A folder you have not trusted is read-only to the agent and its rules, hooks and agents do not run. A plugin prints every hook and tool server it would run before it installs, and installs only when you say yes. In a headless run the project's agent files cannot start their tool servers unless you pass a flag for that run. Under --permissions auto the agent refuses risky commands, requests off your machine and git push, so publishing stays a step in your workflow. Details in the CLI docs.

An agent that asks before it trusts a repository

Untrusted folders stay read-only and nothing they carry runs until you say so. Free to start.

Start free | Download

Also on the blog